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CONVERTIBLE PROPERTY.
CoNVERsIoN has long passed beyond its primitive scope. No
more, as in the days of COKE, can it be said of this tort, that
"there must be an act done to convert one thing into another"
(Isaac v. Clark, 1 Bulst. 312), in that literal sense which implies
the turning of one species of chattel into another. Far past
seems the time when the term was thus limited to cases where
goods were altered so as to lose their identity, whether by adulter-
ation, manufacture or other mode of transformation, or were
utterly destroyed without justification.
It was a wide extension of the term to include instances where
the goods were sold by a bailee and the proceeds appropriated to
his own use; for there the conversion into money was not a phys-
ical transformation, like the change of gold into coin or jewelry.
But nowadays the conversion need not be by alteration or appro-
priation alone. It may be effected in an infinite variety of ways.
It may consist of seizure, withholding, or other complete exclusion
of the owner, or person having the better right, from the control
of the goods; or it may consist simply of a purchase of goods
from one who has himself been guilty of a conversion in disposing
of them, provided the buyer takes the goods into his custody.
The ground is not even covered by the phraseology of the
remodeled English forms of procedure, which, in describing
the breach of duty, allege that the defendant "converted to his
own use, or wrongfully deprived the plaintiff, of the use and pos-
session of the plaintiff's goods." For the appropriation may be to
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another's use, as by an agent for the benefit of his principal, or by
a servant for his master; so the consumption of the goods may
not be accomplished by the defendant himself, but by a third party,
as where the defendant gives another's wine to his own friend,
who drinks it: ifiort v. Bott, L. R. 9 Exch. 86. Yet, on the
other hand, there are limitations, for it is considered that it must
appear that the plaintiff's dominion over his property has been
interfered with not in a particular way, but altogether; that he has
been entirely deprived of the use of it: England v. Cowley,
L. R., 8 Exch. 126.
Boll of Convertible Property.-Convertible property, therefore,
involving the idea of property subject to conversion, and recover-
able in specie or money equivalent by the remedies for such tort,
has come to have a much wider range than it embraced in the
days when the fiction of finding was the basis of trover, or replevin
was the remedy merely for a wrongful distress. It is this expan-
sion of the phrase, in its application to various objects, which now
demands attention, indicative as it is of modern phases of legal
development.
The designation now embraces every species of personal pro-
perty, be it animate or inanimate, tangible or intangible. Con-
version is co-extensive in this respect with trespass upon personalty,
and likewise attaches its remedial efficacy to whatever, of a
movable nature, is capable of ownership as property. Hence, the
roll of convertible property embraces tame animals, whether
domestic, like the dog (Cumming8 v. _Perham, 1 Mete. (Mass.)
555; Binstead v. Buck, 2 W. Bla. 1117), or domesticated, as wild
geese may be: Amory v. Flyn, 10 Johns. 102; and wild animals,
while in the charge of a keeper, or under his control, or when cap-
tured by the pursuing hunter. Thus trover lies for a whale which
has been killed and anchored with marks of appropriation by the
captors: Taber v. Jenny, Sprague 315; and for oysters which are
planted so as to show private ownership: Shepard v. Leverson,
1 N. J. L. 284. In the vegetable world, the 'list includes wild
berries picked by trespassers (Peeman v. Underwood, 66 Me. 229),
and turpentine run into boxes that were cut into trees: Branch v.
Morrison, 5 Jones Law (N. C.) 16. Among minerals, the cata-
logue has not even been confined to those of terrestrial origin, but
replevin has recently been brought for an mrolite in a museum.
Nor is it requisite that the chattel be of a corporeal character.
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Conversion is maintainable not only for a gold piece of private
issue (Chapman v. Cole, 12 Gray 141), and coin in a bag (Griffith
v. Bogardus, 14 Cal. 410; Skidmore v. Taylor, 29 Id. 619), but
also for promissory notes (Pierce v. Gilson, 9 Vt. 216), and
other negotiable securities (Comparet v. Burr, 5 Blackf. 419), cer-
tificates of stock (Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600; Atkins
v. Gamble, 42 Cal. 98), and, as it is held, even for the shares
themselves: Ayres v. French, 41 Conn. 142; Boylan v. ifuguet,
8 Nev. 345; Kuhn v. McAllister, 1 Utah 275; Paine v. Elliott,
5 Pac. 0. L. J. 155--Contra, Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Penn. St. 407.
So it lies for property not figuring in commercial transactions, as
process of court (Keeler v. Fassett, 21 Vt. 539), and every sort of
valuable or important paper. Yet, curious as it may seem, it has
been found necessary to rule that replevin does not lie for a coffin
and its contents, when those contents consist of a corpse, in which
there can be no property: Guthrie v. Weaver, 1 Mo. App. 136.
The court said that when a coffin has been, with the consent of all
persons having any pecuniary interest in it, deposited in the earth
for the purpose of interment, with a corpse enclosed within it, it
is no longer an article of merchandise, the title to which can be
settled in a contest of the husband of deceased with her father
over the disinterment of the remains.
Objects severed from the Freehold.-It is familiar elementary
doctrine, however, that conversion can be predicated only of per-
sonal property. It cannot be maintained for real estate, or for
anything forming a part of the realty, so long as it is connected
therewith: 6 Wait's Actions and Defences 158. But when any-
thing that is annexed to the freehold, as growing crops, trees,
buildings, machinery or other fixtures, are severed therefrom, they
become personal property; and from that time action lies for their
conversion (6 Wait's Actions and Defences 162), for the severance,
while it alters the character of the property, does not change the
title: _iley v. Boston W. P. Co., 11 Cush. 11; Halleck v
Mixer, 16 Cal. 574.
Timber Trees and Growing rops.-Products of the Soil.-
The doctrine is clearly applicable to the products of the soil.
Thus standing trees or timber belong to the realty, but when cut
down they become personalty, and one who thereupon carries them
away without authority is liable for conversion to the owner of the
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realty, or his representative: Whidden v. Seelye, 40 Me. 247;
Sampson v. 1ammond, 4 Cal. 184. See also Mfoores v. Wait, 3
Wend. 104. The same rule prevails with growing crops, and
hence conversion is maintainable for cutting and carrying away
corn and stalks standing and growing: .Nelson v. Burt, 15
Mass. 204.
Portion of Freehod.-Earth.-Nor does it alter the doctrine
if the severance be of a portion of the freehold itself. Hence
severed earth is the* subject of conversion, for which trover will
lie. This was held in Biley v. The Boston Water Power Com-
pany, 11 Cash. 11, which was trover for three hundred and
ninety-four squares of dirt, sand and gravel, severed by tres-
passers upon the land, and bought by some of the defendants, at
whose direction it was tipped up at the filling ground which they
were improving under a contract with the other defendant, the
Water Power Company. The court aptly said: "It is certainly
true that for an injury to his real estate the party cannot main-
tain trover. That form of action is appropriate exclusively to the
recovery of damages for the unlawful conversion of personal pro-
perty. But this being granted, the further inquiry is, whether the
three hundred and ninety-four squares of earth severed from the
land of the plaintiff and removed from the same and sold to
the defendants and used by them, was, at the time of such pur-
chase by the defendants and use of the same, still a part of the
realty and retained unchanged its character as such, or whether by
the act of separation in fact, and a removal of the earth to a dis-
tant place, it has not changed the character of the earth so
removed to that of personal property. It seems to us that it
is very well settled, that whatever is severed from the land-as in
the familiar case of standing timber trees-if such trees, being
a part of the realty, are cut down, they cease to be real estate and
become personal. But this transmutation, while it changes the char-
acter of the property in this -respect, does not change its owner-
ship. It would not do so if cut down by the owner of the land,
and not any more so by being cut -down by a person entering
unlawfully upon the land and making the severance. It is the
actual severance that changes the property from real to personal,
and that irrespective of its being done with or without the consent
of the owner of the land. And in this respect we see no distinc-
CONVERTIBLE PROPERTY.
tion between removing living trees, deriving their nourishment
from the earth, and the removal of a portion of the earth itself."
Similarly it has been held that trover is maintainable for a stone
split out from a rock in a farm. It had been detached by plain-
tiff from its original situation on the ledge, and laid up preparatory
to its removal for use in the construction of a tomb. Plaintiff
having sold the farm, the stone lay there for over thirty-two years:
then defendant bought the property of the first purchaser, and
moved off the stone to his own premises, a conversion for
which he was held responsible after such a great lapse of time:
NAoble v. Merrick, 42 Vt. 146.
Ore.-Upon the same principle trover is maintainable for
minerals severed from the soil, as coal mined and carried away
through mistake in going beyond the boundary line (Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Penn. St. 291. For measure of damages, see Blanch-
ard & Weeks L. C. on Mines 633); or tin-ore carted off in sand
or gravel thrown up from the pits: Northam v. Bowden, 1-1
Exch. 70.
Ice.-It is upon a like basis that ice may be the subject of con-
version. When originally formed, it is a part of the realty, and
according to the prevailing opinion, belongs to the owner of the
soil whereon the body of water is situated: Mill Biver Co v.
Smith, 34 Conn. 462; State v. Pottemeyer, 33 Ind. 402; Paine
v. Woods, 108 Mass. 173. But when cut and taken from a pond
or stream, as for purposes of merchandise (1 Schouler Pers. Pro-
perty 86), the ice becomes a chattel personal, and is the subject
of conversion. In the recent case of Higgins v. Kusterer, 41
Mich. 318, it has been maintained that even before cutting, ice
could be sold where formed, as personalty. This view may be
justified under the doctrine of constructive severance, which is
applied to growing timber (1 Schouler Pers. Prop. 124), and in
fact generally to fruit trees, crops, &c. (Id. 84, 125), as when
these are sold separately from the realty, with the intention that
they shall be speedily removed. But the court seems to have
gone further than the facts of the case, which received attention
out of all proportion to its pecuniary importance, required, and
reasoned from the ephemeral character of the ice in controversy
that such was the general rule; whereas it is only upon the theory
of constructive severance that it could be said that any sale of ice
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ready formed, as a distinct commodity, whether in or out of the
water at the time, is a sale of personalty.
That ice is convertible property, in the original sense of the
term, appears to be maintained in another recent case. In
Aschermann v. Philip Best Brewing Co., 45 Wis. 262, defend-
ant took possession under a chattel-mortgage he held, of a build-
ing containing a beer-room and an ice-room connected by slides,
plaintiffs failing, after notice, to remove their ice, defendant opened
the slides between the two rooms, and allowed a current of air to
pass over the ice and into the beer-room, cooling the beer and
causing a more rapid melting of the ice than would otherwise have
occurred. The court held the defendant responsible for conver-
sion, because the ice was destroyed as effectually, if not so rapidly,
as it would have been had the defendant taken the same quantity
from the ice-house in midsummer and exposed it a sufficient time
to the rays of the sun.
NaturalAccessions-fanure.-As with portions of the freehold,
so with natural accessions to the soil, as manure. The general rule
appears to be that manure made in the course of husbandry, upon
a farm, is a part of the realty (Middlebrook v. Corwin, 15 Wend.
169; Daniels v. Pond, 21 Pick. 367), and this has been main-
tained, in determining the liability of an administratrix, of manure
taken from the barnyard of the homestead, and standing in a pile
on the land, although not broken up nor rotten, nor in a fit state
for incorporation with the soil: Tay v. Muzzey, 13 Gray 53. On
the other hand, the character of personal property attaches to
manure made in a livery stable, or in any manner not connected
with agriculture, or not in a course of husbandry (Daniels v.
Pond, 21 Pick. 372), and this has been applied to manure from
a hotel stable, though afterwards spread upon the land in the
usual course of husbandry: Tay v. Zbuzzey, supra. Of course
in such cases, it is as much the subject of conversion as other
personalty. So it has been held, that manuke lying upon the
earth but not incorporated with the soil, is personal property, and
that, therefore, trover lies for its removal (Pinkham v. Gear,
3 N. H. 484), and is even maintainable by one who raked it into
heaps where it had accumulated in the street: Haslem v. Lock-
wood, 37 Conn. 500. Where, however, manure is part of the
realty, the effect of severance is as heretofore illustrated; hence
trover lies for manure that is severed from the freehold, as from a
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farm, and carried to other premises: Stone v. Proctor, 2 Chip.
(Vt.) 108.
Artificial Annexation8-Buildings.-The doctrine which ap
plies to the severance of portions of the soil, and of vegetation
growing thereon, and of natural accessions thereto, is equally
applicable to objects artificially annexed to the freehold, however
ponderous or bulky, Thus buildings, such as dwelling-houses
and similar structures, are prima facie real estate: Wells on
Replevin 43; Chatterton v. Saul, 16 Ill. 149; Goff v. O' Conner,
Id. 421; Meyers v. Schemp, 67 Id. 471; Smith v. Benson, 1
Hill (N. Y.) 176; Madigan v. McCarthy, 108 Mass. 377;
Dame v. Dame, 38 N. H. 432. But a building may become per-
sonal property with the consent of the owner of the land, express
or implied: Smith v. Benson, supra; Puller v. Tabor, 39 Me.
519; Dame v. Dame, 38 N. H. 429; D. T. of Corwin v. Moore-
head, 43 Iowa 466; Harris v. Powers, 57 Ala. 139; Wells on
Replevin 43. See Gibbs v. Estey, 15 Gray 587; Dolliver v.
lEla, 128 Mass. 557. So it may be regarded as personal pro-
perty on account of the action of the defendant in treating it
as such, which estops him from claiming otherwise: -Davis v.
Taylor, 41 Ill. 407.
Again, the difference may depend on the question of attach-
ment to the ground. Thus the general tendency seems to be to
regard buildings as real property if erected on a foundation (Madi-
gan v. McCarthy, 108 Mass. 376) excavated in the soil, or even
if set on stone piers (Landon v. Platt, 34 Conn. 517), and an-
nexed to the land; but to treat a building as personal property if
not affixed to the soil (Tyler v. Decker, 10 Cal. 435), as where it
is set on wooden blocks resting on the surface of the earth (Hinck-
ley v. Baxter, 13 Allen 139; Pennybacker v. McDougal, 48 Cal.
162; Mills v. Bedick, 1 Neb. 437; but see Ruebschmann v.
McHenry, 29 Wis. 655; Ogden v. Stock, 34 Ill. 522; Salter v.
Sample, 71 Id. 430); without any underpinning: Pullen v. Bell,
40 Me. 314; Hinckley v. Baxter, 13 Allen 139.
Of course, whenever a building is personal property it is the
subject of conversion, and the owner of the land is liable if he
resists its removal by the builder, or otherwise converts it to his
own use: Davis v. Taylor, 41 Ill. 405; Dame v. Dame, 38 N.
I1. 429; Harris v. Powers, 57 Ala. 139. But even where a
building is real property, but has been severed from the land, it
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thereby becomes personalty, and action lies for its conversion: as
where it is removed by a party (Ogden v. Stock, 34 Ill. 522),
after an ejectment suit has been decided against him (Iluebschmann
v. McHenry, 29 Wis. 655), or carried away by a flood, and floated
off into the street: Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433.
Perhaps the best summary of the doctrine governing this species
of convertible property, so far as concerns the effect of agreement,
is conveyed in an opinion given in the case of a dispute over a
school-house erected by a town on land which turned out to belong
to the adjacent parish: First Parish in Sudbury v. Jones, 8 Cush.
184, per BIGELOW, J. "The term 'land,'" it was there said,
"legally includes all houses and buildings standing thereon.
Whatever is affixed to the realty is thereby made parcel thereof,
and belongs to the owner of the soil. * * * Things personal in
their nature, but prepared and intended to be used with real estate,
having been fixed to "the realty and used with it, become part of
the land by accession, pass with it, and belong to the owner of the
land. * * * It follows, that where there is no agreement to
change the legal rights of the parties, materials, when used for
building a house, become part of the freehold, and cannot be
reclaimed by their original owner after annexation to the realty,
as against the owner of the land to which they have been affixed.
Buildings erected on land of another voluntarily and without any
contract with the owner, become part of the real estate, and belong
to the owner of the soil: ' Washburn v. Sproat, 16 Mass. 449;
Leland v. Gassett, 17 Vt. 403; Peirce v. Goddard, 22 Pick.
559. An exception is admitted to this general rule, where there
is an agreement express or implied, between the owner of the real
estate and the proprietor of materials and buildings, that when
annexed to the realty, they shall not become parts of it, but shall
still remain the property of the person annexing them. In such
case the law gives effect to the agreement of the parties, and per-
sonal property, though affixed to the realty, retains its original
characteristics and belongs to the original owner.
"Within this exception are included not only cases where there
is an express agreement between the parties, that personal pro-
perty shall not become real estate by annexation to the soil, but
also that large class of cases which arise between landlord and
tenant, in which by agreement either express, or imiplied from
usage or otherwise, the tenant is allowed to retain as his own pro-
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perty, if reasonably removed, fixtures erected by him for purposes
of trade, ornament or ordinary use, upon leasehold premises during
his tenancy."
Fiztures.-We are thus naturally brought to the consideration
of fixtures, which are not only the fit subject of separate treatises,
but even in their connection with conversion would require special
treatment.' The law as between lessor and lessee having just
been stated, though in a general way, a single case of recent date
will suffice to illustrate the nature of the questions which arise
where no such relation exists. Thus, in Morrison v. Berry,
42 Mich. 389, the refusal of the owner of the freehold to allow
the removal of apparatus for supplying gas, in the nature of a
fixture, placed thereon without his consent by a third person, was
held not a conversion of personal property. A manufacturer of
gas machines, under a contract with the husband, placed such
machine on the land of the wife; and it was considered that even
assuming that the contract could be'rescinded for fraud, as to the
husband, the wife, not being a party thereto in any way, would
not be liable in trover for refusal to surrender the property. The
court says: "It is also elementary doctrine that a person who
makes improvements on the land of another, where the landowner
has not been in fault about it, does so at the risk of losing both
his property and his labor. * * * It is not a question here
whether articles of ambiguous character, not intended for perma-
nent annexation, have become a part of the freehold. Here the
intention was explicit and not open to any controversy. The case
in no way differs from a contract to build a house on the lot, or to
make repairs on it. The equities would be as strong in the one
case as in the other, and the law is identical in both cases. The
amount of injury to the freehold which would be caused by the
removal is not the question. If it is a part of the freehold it can-
not be taken away. The removal of locks from doors, or doors
from their hinges, or windows from their frames, or fences or gates
from the ground, may generally be made without doing any
serious harm to the rest of the building beyond the inconvenience
of doing without them, but no one has ever supposed they could
be so removed without taking away what is a part of the freehold.
I For a collection of cases where trover was brought for fixtures, see 6 Wait's
Actions and Defences 158-162.
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* * * A refusal to allow the removal of what has become, by the
act and intervention of the demandant, a part of the freehold,
cannot * * * be treated as a conversion of personal property."
Judge CooLEY'S dissenting opinion, fully presenting the oppo-
site view, was to this effect: "There is no pretence that the wife
has dealt with her husband in any capacity in respect to the
articles in controversy. He was not her agent in buying them,
nor her vendor. It would be different if she had purchased
them in good faith, without knowledge of his fraud. But she has
bought nothing; she has simply been quiescent while her husband
has been making these improvements upon her premises. Neither
was it claimed that the machine, pipe and fixtures could not be
removed without injury to the premises. The case, then, is this:
the plaintiffs parted with their goods under circumstances which
entitle them to rescind the sale and recover them back or their
value. The fraudulent purchaser of the goods has affixed them to
the realty of a third person, but under such circumstances that
had the realty been his, he could not have retained them. The
third person, without a shadow of equity, now seeks to retain
them on the purely technical ground that by being affixed to her
realty, their legal nature has been changed, and they have become
an inseparable part of her own property. But according to
Adam8 v. Lee, 31 Mich. 441, unity of title in the freehold, and
in that which is annexed to it, is essential in order that the latter
may become a part of the realty. It is not pretended that there
was any such unity of title here, unless the annexation itself
brought it about. The old notion that physical annexation should
have this extraordinary effect, was said, in Meigs's Apveal, 62
Penn. St. 28, to be exploded, and that the question of fixture or
no fixture must depend upon the intention of the parties. ' There
is,' says the chief justice, in Wheeler v. Bedell, 40 Mich. 693,
69, 'no universal test whereby the character of what is claimed
to be a fixture can be determined in the abstract. Neither the
mode of annexation nor the manner of use is in'all cases conclu-
sive. It must usually depend on the express or implied under-
standing of the parties concerned.' But who are the parties
whose consent or understanding must control.? Surely if one
having the movable thing of another in his possession, annexes it
without the consent of the owner to the real estate of a third
party, it would not thereupon, and by force of that act alone,
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become the property of the third party: Cochran v. Mint, 57
N. H. 514, 547. One man cannot give away the property of
another in this manner. The consent of parties that shall con-
vert a chattel into an inseparable part of the realty, is the consent
of the parties owning the chattel and the realty respectively."
These conflicting views have been cited at length, because fairly
representative of the doubts which encumber this topic. It may
be clarifying, however, to analyze the elements of controversy in
such cases. The first question to be settled is this: Is the article,
on account of actual or constructive annexation, an inseparable
part of the realty, or is it removable by the party who placed it
there? The answer belongs to the domain of fixtures. Its only
relation to the department of conversion is the effect on the title.
If the article has not changed its personal nature, it may be
emoved by the one who placed it on the land, without his incur-
ring any liability therefor; and conversely, should the owner of
the realty prevent its removal, he is responsible for such conver-
sion. If the article has become, however, an inseparable par of
the realty, in the legal sense, the landowner is entirely free from
liability for preventing its removal, and if the one who placed it
there severs it from the freehold, and thus makes it personalty
again, conversion is maintainable against him.
Telegraph Poles.-The matter has, in a recent instance of the
severance of telegraph poles, been differently regarded, where the
controversy was not between the owner of the realty and the an-
nexer of the chattels, but between the latter and a trespasser who
severed and removed the articles in dispute, and was sued in con-
version therefor. This suit of the American Union Telegraph Co.
v. liddleton, 80 N. Y 408, was brought to recover damages for
wrongfully. and maliciously cutting down, and unlawfully carrying
away and converting twenty-three telegraph poles, wires and
insulators attached thereto, located in the state of New Jersey,
and forming part of a continuous line of telegraph in operation in
that state. The question was really whether the defendant should
be discharged from arrest, but the court, in deciding this affirma-
tively, maintained that conversion was not the proper form of
action; that the telegraph poles and appurtenances were affixed to
the soil, and constituted a part of the freehold; and that as they
could not be cut down without an entry on the realty, and this
constitutes a material part of the damages, the only action which
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can properly be brought is trespass quare clausum fregit. The
objection that the tortious acts were committed upon the highway,
where the defendant had a right to be, and hence there could be
no trespass on the close, is met by reiterating that the plaintiffs
had affixed their poles to the realty, and the cutting away of the
same was a trespass remediable only in the manner already pointed
out. To the further objection that the gravamen of the com-
plaint was for carrying away and converting the poles which were
severed, and were personal property after the cutting, even if they
were a part of the realty previously, this answer was made: "It
"s quite obvious that the cutting of the poles and the removal of
them was one continuous and uninterrupted transaction, insepar-
ably connected together, and constituted a single cause of action
which cannot be divided into two actions-one for the cutting and
another for the conversion. The one was a part of the other, and
the conversion so coupled with the cutting that they were the
same." If the suit were brought by the owner of the realty, the
position of the court on this point would hardly be in accordance
with the general view, which has been thus pithily expressed:
"In very strict form, trespass is the proper remedy for a wrongful
taking of personal property, and for cutting timber, or quarrying
stone, or digging coal on another man's land, and carrying it
away; and yet the trespass may be waived and trover brought,
without giving up any claim for any outrage or violence in the act
of taking. * * * When the taking and conversion are one act, or
one continued series of acts, trespass is the more obvious and
proper remedy. But the law allows the waiver of the taking, so
that the party may sue in trover."
The decision was further justified on the final ground that the
conversion itself was not established. "The defendant," it was
said, "only carried the poles and wires from the place in the high-
way where they were cut, to the ditches and side fences of the
road, and left them there, or placed them on the side fences by
the roadside. There was no assumption of possession, no attempt
to exercise control or to convert to his own use. * * * The
mere act of removal, of itself, independent of any claim over
them in favor of the defendant or any one else, does not amount
to the conversion of the poles, wires and insulators."
Annexation by Trespasser or Converter.-In the case of the
gas machine or the telegraph poles, it will be noted that the qucs-
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tion has touched the right or effect of severance, where the chattel
was annexed to the land of a stranger by the owner or party hav-
ing the right to the immediate possession of the chattel. But
suppose a party lacking such rigfit, annex an article of personal
property to his own land, is he liable for conversion? Has the
article become an inseparable part of the realty, in title as well as
character, or is the conversion into real estate in nowise different
from transformation into a different species of personal property ?
The latter would seem to be the more reasonable construction, and
it has accordingly been held that, trover lies in such cases, even
against a subsequent purchaser of the land: St. Louis, &c., Rail-
road Co. v. Kaulbrumer, 59 Ill. 152; Ogden v. Lucas, 48 Id.
492. It has properly been held, however, that replevin will not
lie in such cases, for the same reason that it is not maintainable
in any other case where the separate identity of an article can no
longer be ascertained: Rickett v. Darrel, 55 Ind. 470. The
action was against one who had wrongfully removed fence rails
and stakes and used them in the construction of a fence upon his
real estate. The court admitted that "when a tree is converted
into rails, it may be replevied; and when timber is wrongfully cut
and converted into coal, the coal may be replevied. When an
article is made personal property by being severed from the realty
to which it first belonged, it may be replevied as long as its sepa-
rate identity can be ascertained, whatever shape it may take; but
when an article of personal property, though wrongfully taken,
has become real estate by being attached to the realty, it cannot
be replevied, because it has lost its separate identity and its char-
acter as personal property." This was illustrated by the statement
that if a person wrongfully took and detained shingles, and nailed
them upon his roof, or bricks, and laid them in a mill, replevin
ought not to be maintainable, though the owner's rights were
greatly outraged, for other remedies will afford redress. Hence it
was concluded that in this case the rails could not be replevied,
because they have lost their separate identity, and could not be
delivered without detaching them from the realty, of which they
have become a part.
Be-annexation.-Of course the same rules would govern where
the article is first severed from the realty of another, and then
re-annexed to his own soil by the trespasser; and this has been
so held in the case of buildings (Huebschmann v. McHenry, 29 Wis.
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655), although the general principle is recognised, that a Duilding
while in transit from one lot to another is personalty, but when
re-affixed again becomes realty: Salter v. Sample, 71 111. 430;
-Northup v. Trask, 89 Wis. 515. Yet, the case would naturally
be different if the owner of the realty was sued in conversion, for
permitting the equitable owner of a building to affix it to his soil:
.Yorthup v. Trask, 8uTpra.
Subsequent Purchaser.-Furthermore, whether the chattel has
been annexed or re-annexed to the realty by a trespasser or con-
verter, a bonafide purchaser of the realty seems to be regarded as
not liable in conversion: Peirce v. Goddard, 22 Pick. 559 ; .Pryatt
v. Sullivan Co., 5 Hill 116; affirmed, 7 Hill 529; Dolliverv. .Ela,
128 Mass. 557. But see Ogden v. Lucas, 48 Ill. 492; St. Louis,
s'e., Railroad Co. v. Kaulbrumer, 59 Ill. 152. It is even said:
"A man cannot maintain an action against me, by proving that
the person from whom I purchased my house, wrongfully took or
converted the brick, stone, timber, lime or other materials of
which my house was constructed. Nor can he enter and tear down
my house, for the purpose of regaining that portion of it which
once belonged to him. His only remedy is against the wrong-
aoer." This is certainly true, so far as replevin against the
purchaser of realty is concerned. That the same principle applies
where trover is brought, is illustrated by the late case of the De-
troit &. Bay City Railway Co. v. Busch, 43 Mich. 571. There,
ties were taken by one who was a sub-contractor for building a
railroad, and were used by him in the construction of the road.
The sub-contractor put them here and there among the other ties
used in forming the super-structure of the railway, spiking rails to
them in the usual manner. The road was not delivered up to the
company complete and ballasted, until four or five months after,
though used somewhat earlier. It was held, that the owner of the
ties, after waiting until they had become realty, could not bring
trover against the railroad company as for their conversion; that
the only conversion took place before the company had any control
over the property; that receiving it as realty, a subsequent neglect
or refusal to detach it, could not be regarded as a conversion; and
that plaintiff had his remedy against the contractors, for the only
conversion that ever took place. It will thus be seen, that in
these cases a different rule prevails from that which governs per-
sonalty; for a bonafide purchaser of a chattel from a trespassei
